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INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AGENCY LIFE CYCLE, 
AND THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 
David A. Hyman* & William E. Kovacic** 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S. antitrust professors have their own version of the Marquess of 
Queensberry Rules.  The most important rule is that arguments about the 
merits of any given case, dispute, or regulatory decision/action must be 
faithful to the Gospel of Antitrust (i.e., the specific history, logic, and 
objectives that justified the adoption of the U.S. competition laws in the 
first place). 
Of course, it complicates matters slightly that there are at least three 
competing versions of the Gospel:  the Chicago School, the post–Chicago 
School, and the Market-Egalitarian School.1  Consider the basic tenets of 
each school.  Chicago School enthusiasts, following in the footsteps of 
Robert Bork, frame their arguments about the original aims of U.S. antitrust 
law solely in terms of economic efficiency.2  As one federal court of 
appeals panel put it,  
Defendants’ concern for the weakest among them has a quaint Rawlsian 
charm to it, but we find it hard to square with the competitive philosophy 
of our antitrust laws.  Inefficiency is precisely what the market aims to 
weed out.  The Sherman Act, to put it bluntly, contemplates some road 
kill on the turnpike to Efficiencyville.3 
Post–Chicago School enthusiasts accept the importance of efficiency but 
argue that the antitrust laws also exist to achieve other economic ends, 
including the protection of consumer choice and the prevention of unfair 
 
*  H. Ross & Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Medicine, University of 
Illinois.  From 2001 to 2004, he served as Special Counsel at the Federal Trade Commission.  
**  Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law 
School.  From 2001 to 2011, he was, at various points, the General Counsel, Commissioner, 
and Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. 
 1. In many ways, these are imprecise classifications, but they are accurate enough for 
our purposes. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition 
Law for Dominant Firm Conduct:  The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 4–15. 
 2. Bork’s formative contributions are ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 
(1978), and Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & 
ECON. 7 (1966). 
 3. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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transfers of wealth from consumers to producers.4  Market-Egalitarian 
School enthusiasts discern larger egalitarian aims in the antitrust laws.  
Some emphasize the importance of preserving opportunities for smaller 
firms and individual entrepreneurs to gain access to the market and 
compete.5  Others stress legislative expressions of concern about preventing 
concentrations of economic power from sapping the vitality of democratic 
institutions.6 
On some matters relating to goals, doctrine, and analytical method, 
enthusiasts of all three schools agree.  For example, there is a broad 
consensus that Congress adopted the Robinson-Patman Act7 and its ban on 
certain forms of price discrimination to protect small businesses as an end 
in itself by ensuring that large businesses (especially powerful buyers) did 
not disadvantage the small local vendors with whom at least some 
Americans prefer to trade.8  Perhaps because of the Act’s unabashedly 
protectionist roots and dubious economic effects, academics of all 
persuasions have acquiesced in its abandonment by the public antitrust 
agencies.9  It is no small irony that those who find themselves obsessed 
with the market power of Walmart seem to have forgotten that the A&P of 
blessed memory was the Walmart of its day.10 
Nonetheless, on many other issues, enthusiasts of the three schools 
disagree strongly about the proper content of antitrust policy.  The source of 
disagreement cuts across a wide range of antitrust matters, whether the 
immediate issue for debate is whether to challenge a merger or not; whether 
to demand certain divestitures; whether to accept various efficiency or state 
action defenses; or whether a new administration is behaving differently 
 
 4. Robert Lande’s study is the leading treatment of the distributional concerns of the 
antitrust statutes. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 
(1982).  The leading exponents of the consumer choice model are Professor Lande and Neil 
Averitt. Robert H. Lande & Neil Averitt, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to 
Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007). 
 5. This is a central theme in the work of Eleanor Fox. Eleanor M. Fox, The 
Modernization of Antitrust:  A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981).  In its 
interpretation of the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act’s merger control 
provision, the Supreme Court in 1962 said “[w]e cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to 
promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned business.” 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
 6. See generally David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1219 (1988). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13b, 21a (2006). 
 8. See Terry Calvani & Gilde Breidenbach, An Introduction to the Robinson-Patman 
Act and Its Enforcement by the Government, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 766 (1991); Hugh C. 
Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law:  A Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113, 1120–
24 (1983). 
 9. See infra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the decline in public 
enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act). 
 10. Nancy F. Koehn, Before Wal-Mart, There Was A&P, N.Y. TIMES (Sep 3. 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/business/in-aps-story-parallels-to-retail-battles-of-
today.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  The A&P was actually the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Company. 
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than a predecessor administration.  Bubbling under the surface of each of 
these disputes is a contest over the ownership of the intellectual DNA of the 
antitrust laws—and with it, the ability to praise or condemn any given 
decision based on the Gospel of Antitrust. 
There is much at stake in such debates, but we believe the exclusive 
focus on the Gospel of Antitrust overlooks an important issue.  It is striking 
that, at this and every other symposia on antitrust that we can recall, far 
more time is spent measuring the decisions of the antitrust agencies against 
their fidelity to the principles of long-dead legislators, than on inquiring 
whether the specific decision in question represented a sensible response to 
the institutional forces and constraints under which the antitrust agencies 
actually operate on a day-to-day basis.  In this Symposium and in other 
gatherings, there is a tendency to ignore how antitrust agencies go about 
defining their aims, selecting among the mix of available strategies, and 
deploying their personnel in a constant attempt to fill N+1 holes in the dikes 
they are required to defend, when they only have N corks with which to do 
so. 
We use this Essay to highlight some of the less exalted (but by no means 
less important) issues in the public administration of our nation’s antitrust 
laws.  Our analysis builds on work that we have previously published in the 
European Competition Journal11 and on a forthcoming publication in 
Concurrences.12 
We proceed as follows.  In Part I, we describe the complications that can 
result from the ambiguous objectives and expectations that invariably 
accompany the adoption of a competition law.  In Part II, we describe how 
agencies, in the course of implementation, make their own decisions that 
influence the development of competition law and simultaneously constrain 
the range of options for that entity going forward.  Part III offers 
observations about how agencies can manage legislative commands that are 
inconsistent, conflicting, schizophrenic, or out-and-out foolish. 
I.  HORTON HATCHES AN EGG 
When legislatures pass new laws, they invariably specify what the 
penalties will be for violating the law, which agency or agencies will 
enforce the law, and which senators and congressman should get the credit 
for the legislation (e.g., the Sherman Act13).  However, in our experience, 
 
 11. William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Competition Agency Design:  What’s on 
the Menu?, 8 EUROPEAN COMP. J. 527 (2012). 
 12. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy 
Portfolios:  Divide or Conquer?, CONCURRENCES (forthcoming 2013). 
 13. The Sherman Act was named for Senator John Sherman, the brother of General 
William Tecumseh Sherman, the civil war hero.  George Stigler, who won a Nobel Prize in 
Economics, once jokingly compared the implications for case outcomes if the Sherman Act 
had been named for General William T. Sherman, instead of Senator John Sherman. See 
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 8–9 
(1982) (“Consider the problem of defining a market within which the existence of 
competition or some form of monopoly is to be determined. The typical antitrust case is an 
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legislatures demonstrate far less concern with more prosaic matters that can 
make a huge difference in whether a law actually “works” on the ground.   
Of course, it is a good thing if the law spells out the penalties for 
violation and also allocates enforcement responsibility to someone.  And, 
credit claiming is important to create the necessary incentives for legislators 
to actually enact legislation. 
But, much more is required for a legal regime to be effective.  Consider 
the challenges of enacting a law that will work well.  What should be 
prohibited, and what should be allowed?  Who should bear the burden of 
proof on which issues?  Some terms must be defined, but which ones?  And 
how should they be defined?  Legislators must guess at the costs of the 
provisions that they are enacting; at the preferences and priorities of those 
who will end up implementing the provisions they have carefully crafted; 
and how those provisions will stand up to technological development and 
political movements they simply cannot imagine.  Legislators must also 
balance the design requirements of a well-functioning law against the 
coalition-building necessary to enact the law.  Statutes with multiple 
purposes are more likely to have provisions that are at odds with one 
another—but it is harder to create a coalition behind a single-purpose 
statute.  Statutes with clear and unambiguous decision rules provide more 
guidance, but create more legislative opposition than a statute drafted with 
more “strategic ambiguity.” 
Quite sensibly, instead of trying to anticipate and resolve all of these hard 
questions with definitive statutory language, the dominant strategy is to 
avoid or paper over many of these issues, leaving them to be argued about 
at a later date—preferably by a future Congress or in front of a judge or an 
administrative agency.  But, the challenge, when that later date eventually 
arrives is significant; the greater the underlying disagreement, incoherence, 
or failure to decide, the more the deciding entity will have to confront 
competing aims and expectations about what the law is supposed to achieve 
and how it should go about doing so.  Worse still, it will have to make its 
decisions in the face of statutory “weasel words” like “reasonable” and 
“appropriate.”14 
 
almost impudent exercise in economic gerrymandering.  The plaintiff sets the market, at a 
maximum, as one state in area and including only aperture-priority SLR cameras selling 
between $200 and $250.  This might be called J-Shermanizing the market, after Senator John 
Sherman.  The defendant will in turn insist that the market is worldwide, and includes not 
only all cameras, but also portrait artists and possibly transportation media because a visit is 
a substitute for a picture.  This might also be called T-Shermanizing the market, this time 
after the Senator’s brother, General William Tecumseh Sherman.  Depending on who 
convinces the judge, the concentration ratios will be awesome or trivial, with a large 
influence on his verdict.”).  Other Congressman have passed into obscurity, but for their 
immortalization in the name of a statute.  Who would remember James Robert Mann but for 
the Mann Act, which prohibited white slavery and the interstate transport of women for 
“immoral purposes”?  Can anyone even name which state he represented?  (Illinois). 
 14. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(“‘Appropriate’ is one of the most wonderful weasel words in the dictionary, and a great aid 
to the resolution of disputed issues in the drafting of legislation.”). 
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The antitrust laws of most nations exemplify these difficulties.  First, the 
legislative text and supporting legislative history often announce a variety 
of objectives.15  It is not unusual for a legislature to announce that the law 
will simultaneously increase economic efficiency, reduce costs, raise 
productivity, increase opportunities for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, improve the well-being of historically disadvantaged social 
groups, and support the development of a more egalitarian political 
environment. 
Admittedly, some legislators may perceive no need for trade-offs among 
these diverse aims.  Professor James May has demonstrated that, in 
adopting the Sherman Act in 1890, many members of Congress believed it 
was possible to pursue a broad plan of economic de-concentration without 
suffering losses in economic efficiency.16  This view stemmed from the 
widely held belief that efficiency considerations rarely, if ever, explained 
the creation or maintenance of immense firms.  Only later did researchers 
show that firms could and did achieve preeminence mainly by reason of 
superior performance and not by improper collusive or exclusionary 
practices. 
In other cases, legislators recognize a tension among some goals (e.g., 
between productivity enhancements and the protection of small business), 
but nonetheless command the agency to pursue both aims in the 
enforcement of the law.  In many countries, the non-efficiency objectives 
remain in the statute because their presence is a precondition for a coalition 
that will support enactment.17  There is good reason to doubt that many 
countries would establish a competition system if economic efficiency were 
the only reason they were allowed to offer in support of enacting such laws. 
A second source of complexity arises from competing legislative 
expectations about how the competition agency will function.  The 
deliberations that led to the creation of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) in 1914 got off the ground because of dissatisfaction with how the 
Department of Justice was enforcing the Sherman Act—but even among 
those who agreed on the need for a second agency in the same space, there 
were competing visions about how the agency should go about making 
policy.18  Some proponents envisioned the Commission as a law-
 
 15. See William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Law Reform in 
Transition Economies:  The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 265 (2001) (describing Kovacic’s experiences advising countries on the 
adoption and implementation of competition laws). 
 16. James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:  Political and Economic Theory in 
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1919, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 391–94 (1989). 
 17. For example, it is certain that South Africa would not have established a new 
competition law system in the late 1990s if the law had not identified, as one of its goals, the 
enhancement of economic opportunities for nonwhite citizens. DAVID LEWIS, THIEVES AT 
THE DINNER TABLE 1–74 (2012) (discussing the origins and aims of South Africa’s modern 
competition law). 
 18. DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ch. 
1 (2011) (discussing the origins of the FTC); Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC:  
Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003) (same). 
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enforcement body that would devise norms of business behavior by means 
of an elastic substantive mandate which it would implement through 
administrative adjudication.  A second camp strongly believed that the 
Commission should make policy through research, report writing, 
consultation with business leaders, and the promulgation of trade regulation 
rules and guidelines, rather than the law-enforcement model that the 
Department of Justice had pioneered. 
The compromise that emerged gave the FTC capabilities consistent with 
both visions.  Legislators from both camps could read the statute and see 
something they liked—and each could hope that their vision would win out, 
depending on the choices made by agency management.  From its first 
days, the FTC was encumbered with significantly different expectations 
about how it would carry out its elastic, open-ended mandate (which 
allowed it to ban “unfair methods of competition”) and about what role it 
would play in the economy.19  As we detail elsewhere, these expansive 
powers turned out to be a Faustian bargain when they led the FTC to 
overreach just as the political tides were turning against it. 
A third source of complexity arises from the diversity of policy 
responsibilities assigned to antitrust agencies.  The FTC is a good example.  
The Commission is a policy conglomerate with three distinct product lines.  
It has responsibility not only for antitrust law but also for consumer 
protection and the increasingly important fields of data protection and 
privacy.  Owing to the breadth of its mandate, the FTC also has become a 
dumping ground for legislative commands that don’t seem to fit anywhere 
else—including quirky statutes such as the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform 
Act.20 
The FTC is not a one-off.  Policy multiplicity is the norm rather than the 
exception for antitrust agencies throughout the world.  By our count, in over 
half of the world’s 120 jurisdictions with competition laws, the agency 
assigned to enforce the antitrust law does something else (most often, 
consumer protection).21  As policy functions increase, the agency may find 
itself responsible for implementing a range of statutes with unrelated or 
even inconsistent aims.  Figuratively speaking, the agency might spend the 
morning preparing a complaint condemning rival companies that are 
colluding to set terms of trade and then spend its afternoon encouraging 
other firms to establish voluntary protocols to restrict the advertising or 
marketing of certain products or services.  In other instances, the agency’s 
policy portfolio does not create internal contradictions, but the varied 
mandates are so diverse and unrelated that they make it difficult for the 
agency to define its purpose in any meaningful way. 
For all of these reasons, it is an oversimplification to believe that 
competition agencies are charged with a single agreed-upon task.  Instead, 
 
 19. Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a Start-Up Agency:  The 
FTC from 1921–1925, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 150–55 (2010). 
 20. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 12. 
 21. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 11, at 527. 
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the agency must balance competing considerations in deciding how to 
implement the statutes it is charged with enforcing.  Part II turns to how 
competition agencies reconcile statutory goals, legislative expectations, and 
an array of substantive mandates, by serving as “shock absorbers.” 
II.  ADAPTATION AND ADJUSTMENT 
Competition agencies respond to diverse policy goals and assignments of 
functions in several ways.  In the discussion below we describe the 
techniques agencies use to cope with varied (and often inconsistent) 
legislative commands and expectations concerning what they should do. 
A.  Initiatives That Fulfill Several Goals 
Sometimes an agency can bring cases or promulgate rules that make 
everyone happy (except for those on the receiving end of the agency’s 
actions).  Thus, in antitrust enforcement, it is possible to identify cases that 
have positive efficiency consequences and achieve distributional goals as 
well.  Some antitrust programs present strong possibilities for simultaneous 
increases in output and manifest improvements in the well-being of the 
poorest citizens.22 
Cases that challenge government restrictions on competition provide 
useful illustrations.  In South Carolina State Board of Dentists,23 the FTC 
challenged restrictions that a state dental board had imposed on a program 
to provide low cost preventive treatment to school-aged children in poor 
areas in South Carolina.24  The program had relied on dental hygienists, 
which was allowed under South Carolina law.  The FTC alleged that the 
dental board prohibited (without the requisite authority from the state 
legislature) any child from receiving treatment from a school hygienist 
unless at least forty-five days had passed since the child had been seen by a 
dentist.  If allowed to stand, the dental board’s decree would have 
dramatically reduced the availability of preventive dental treatments.  The 
affected students overwhelmingly consisted of African American children 
from low-income families.  The FTC’s case yielded a settlement that 
allowed the program to proceed as originally designed.  The agency’s 
intervention had both positive efficiency effects (removing a needless 
restriction on output) and favorable distributional consequences (allowing 
access to care by economically disadvantaged citizens). 
 
 22. These possibilities are described in William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, 
Consumer Protection, and Economic Disadvantage, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101 (2007).  
 23. F.T.C. Docket No. 9311 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/
socodentistcomp.pdf. 
 24. FTC Charges South Carolina Board of Dentistry, FTC (Sept. 15, 2003), http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/socodentist.shtm. 
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B.  Adjustment and Realignment 
Given resource constraints, agencies must necessarily respond to 
changing circumstances and priorities.  The agency has a front row seat 
from which to observe the economic consequences of its actions, and it will 
make adjustments in response to this feedback.  Competition agency 
personnel (e.g., economists, lawyers, high-level managers) also keenly want 
to be seen as skilled professionals who make decisions on the merits, and 
will do their best to ignore demands from elected officials to use their 
discretionary power to serve parochial interests. 
Learning from past experience and the development of strong 
professional standards can have several beneficial consequences for 
policymaking.  These characteristics not only press toward substantive 
policy improvements, but they also give the agency a buffer against 
improvident political intervention.  When these forces operate cooperatively 
and interactively, competition agencies can achieve autonomy as expert, 
technically proficient policymakers who will resist pressure to apply their 
broad policy mandate in politically motivated ways. 
A second source of feedback emerges from the observations of expert 
external observers, such as academic researchers, affected businesses, and 
individual practitioners.  These groups can help inform, and even influence, 
expectations about what agencies should do. 
A third form of feedback comes from the legal system.  In the United 
States, legal precedent from 1945 through the early 1970s emphasized the 
role of antitrust in preserving opportunities for smaller firms and preventing 
aggregations of economic power that might undermine the integrity of the 
political process.25  By the late 1970s, these views had fallen out of favor.  
In cases like Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,26 and Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,27 the Supreme Court disavowed all 
interest in the well-being of individual competitors and instead emphasized 
that economic efficiency was antitrust’s principal aim.  No matter how 
determined an antitrust agency is to advance a legal argument, when the 
Supreme Court slaps it down hard, it is sensible for the agency to reexamine 
its position, and make a different argument the next time around. 
A fourth form of feedback is the adjustments that agencies make in the 
way they allocate their resources among the various programs they operate.  
During the 1960s and before, enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act was 
one of the most prominent FTC flagship brands.  The Commission brought 
many cases on behalf of small retailers who felt that they were being 
discriminated against by suppliers in favor of powerful buyers.  Table 1 
 
 25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the Brown Shoe decision). 
 26. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 27. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
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shows the time trend in the number of Robinson-Patman Act cases brought 
by the FTC from 1960 to 2012.28 
 
Table 1:  FTC Robinson-Patman Act Cases, 1960 to the Present 
 
Period Number of Cases 
Initiated 
Cases/Year 
1960–1968 Cases 518 64.8 Matters 134 14.9 
1969–1976 41 5.9 
1977–1980 8 2.7 
1981–1988 5 0.7 
1989–1992 0 0 
1993–2000 1 0.1 
2001–2008 0 0 
2009–2013 0 0 
 For 1960–1968, there are 518 individual cases, which arise out of 134 distinct matters.  
We present both figures, so readers can draw their own conclusion on the right measure to 
use in assessing the decline in the number of Robinson-Patman Act cases over the past five 
decades. 
 
Congress adopted the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 and made no 
material amendments to the statute throughout the period in question.  From 
the 1980s onward, the courts made it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to 
win these cases.  The more restrictive judicial interpretations might explain 
some marginal shifts in the FTC’s commitment to Robinson-Patman Act 
litigation, but they cannot account for the magnitude of change observed in 
Table 1.  The FTC, as a policy conglomerate, consciously chose to do other 
things with the money and resources that Congress provided. 
So what role, if any, did Congress play in these trends?  We think the 
most plausible explanation is one of congressional negotiation and 
accommodation.  Each year, when it seeks its annual congressional 
appropriation, the FTC must reveal its program choices and specific 
funding allocations for the coming fiscal year.  This allocation process is 
especially important as the agency’s policy functions increase.  These 
budget choices determine which of the agency’s varied responsibilities will 
receive greater or less emphasis and support.  The congressional 
authorization and appropriations committees review these proposed 
allocations, and they understand their significance. 
The agency also makes public statements (speeches, reports, guidelines, 
and the like) in which it spells out such matters for those who are interested.  
 
 28. The data for this table through 2003 are drawn from William E. Kovacic, The 
Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 
410–15 (2003).  The federal antitrust agencies have brought no Robinson-Patman cases since 
2000. 
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Our experience has been that at least some of this information filters its way 
back to Congress.  Various external observers—including journalists, 
lobbyists for specific firms or industries, public interest organizations, and 
trade associations—also bring specific matters to the attention of oversight 
committees or the staffs of individual members.29 
The FTC does not ordinarily make abrupt shifts in direction.30  Instead, it 
backs away from disfavored programs in smaller steps, and sees how 
Congress reacts.  If retrenchment arouses strong opposition, the FTC will 
usually reinstate a program to the original level of enforcement.  If a move 
elicits no objection or only a muted expression of concern, the FTC can 
continue stepwise in the direction it has taken.  This pas de deux permits the 
FTC to change enforcement priorities with what it might reasonably view as 
the consent of Congress.31 
C.  Migration to Other Policy Domains 
When an agency adjusts its priorities, the agency’s subordination or 
abandonment of certain goals does not mean that these objectives disappear 
from public policy.  One reason that legislators acquiesce in agency 
realignment is that they may effectuate their policy goals through other 
legislative measures and/or through other agencies. 
If an antitrust agency concludes that it can no longer enforce limitations 
on vertical restraints by petroleum marketers against smaller dealers 
because judicial precedent has become unfavorable or priorities have 
changed, legislators can introduce new legislation, such as the Petroleum 
Marketing Practices Act,32 which curbs the ability of refiners to alter 
relationships with their downstream distributors.  State law can also act to 
offset newly perceived difficulties with using federal antitrust law.33 
As these examples illustrate, goals and priorities with sufficient 
legislative support never die.  Instead, they migrate to other policy areas and 
reemerge in new forms.  The legislative priority may have been chased out 
of the antitrust neighborhood, but it simply takes up residence in a different 
part of town in another guise—for example, as a sector-specific regulatory 
command or as a transfer payment program. 
 
 29. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked:  Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (identifying 
two distinct forms of Congressional oversight, with “fire alarm” oversight triggered by 
complaints from concerned groups that an agency is misbehaving). 
 30. For one of the exceptions that proves the rule, see infra note 34. 
 31. We do not suggest that antitrust agencies in all jurisdictions engage in precisely the 
same form of interaction with their legislatures or other elected officials when making 
adjustments in policy.  We suggest that some explicit or implicit form of bargaining and 
renegotiation of goals will occur in the face of changed circumstances, without any formal 
amendment of the law. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2841 (2006). 
 33. Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism:  Parker and 
ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29, 31–36 (2000). 
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III.  AGENCY ADAPTATION 
How should agencies manage legislative commands that are inconsistent, 
conflicting, schizophrenic, or out-and-out foolish?  The FTC’s “squishy” 
process of programmatic adaption (accompanied by varying degrees of sub 
silentio congressional approval before the Commission diminishes or 
abandons specific goals or programs) provides an example of one possible 
strategy.  Other agencies, and particular programs within other agencies, 
have followed more direct and hard-edged approaches.34  The resulting 
disputes have tended to be heated, deeply partisan, and can leave lasting bad 
blood.  But they do force a form of immediate programmatic triage—with 
some programs and personnel living to fight for another day and others 
slated for immediate execution.  Further research will be necessary to 
determine which of these strategies is more adaptive, but there are costs and 
benefits to each approach. 
CONCLUSION 
Robert Lucas, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1995, observed 
that “[o]nce one starts thinking about [growth], it is hard to think about 
anything else.”35  Once we started thinking about competition agency 
design, it became hard for us to think about anything else—and we believe 
such matters should play a larger role than they previously have in 
assessing the performance of those agencies and of antitrust law more 
broadly. 
We are skeptical that the antitrust laws, adopted as they were with a 
multiplicity of aims, provide clear and unambiguous direction for current 
 
 34. Consider DOJ policy toward vertical restraints in the 1980s.  Under the leadership of 
William Baxter, the Antitrust Division wanted to urge the Supreme Court to abandon the per 
se ban on resale price maintenance.  Congress adopted legislation that prohibited Baxter 
from arguing that position.  This episode is described in Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust 
Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 644 & nn.117–18 (2001).  For the FTC’s brush with 
the same dynamics, see John R. Wilke, Unlikely Enforcer:  Ardent Reaganite Plays a New 
Tune As Head of the FTC, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2003, at A1 (“Early in the Reagan 
administration, lawmakers hauled a young Federal Trade Commission official before a 
congressional committee and accused him of trying to dismantle the agency.  As the 
exchange grew heated, committee chairman John Dingell ordered the witness to ‘just answer 
the questions ‘yes’ or ‘no.’  So Timothy Muris did exactly that.  ‘Yes or no,’ he responded to 
the next question, and the one after that.  Lawmakers, furious at his insolence, grilled him for 
another hour.  The 32-year-old Reagan revolutionary was branded as an ideologue, bent on 
abandoning consumer protection and undermining antitrust law.”). 
 35. Robert E. Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 3, 5 (1988) (“I do not see how one can look at figures like these without seeing them 
as representing possibilities.  Is there some action a government of India could take that 
would lead the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s?  If so, what, exactly? If 
not, what is it about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so?  The consequences for human 
welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering:  Once one starts to think 
about them, it is hard to think about anything else.”).  Technically, the prize is the Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/. 
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policymaking.36  If that assessment is correct, the dispute over the 
competing versions of the Gospel of Antitrust bears an uncomfortable 
resemblance to the hunting of the snark—“the impossible voyage of an 
improbable crew to find an inconceivable creature.”37 
To summarize, law professors’ fixation on the Gospel of Antitrust has 
caused them to slight or ignore other factors—including the role of public 
agency design in the dynamic architecture of the Church of Antitrust.  
Perhaps it is time for law professors to move to the less glamorous pews 
and consider matters other than the Gospel. 
 
 
 36. See May, supra note 16. 
 37. SIDNEY HERBERT WILLIAMS & FALCONER MADAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LITERATURE 
OF THE REV. C.L. DODGSON (LEWIS CARROLL), quoted in MARTIN GARDNER, THE 
ANNOTATED SNARK 16 (1962). 
